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Introduction  
 
The increase of institutional funds in the industrialized countries has been tremendously rapid within 
the last thirty years, where institutional investors are the largest group of owners managing an 
enormous amount of capital. As a result, institutional investors, are as a group, considered the most 
influential actors on the scenes of the capital markets. In the debate on corporate governance and in 
particular, the role of institutional investors, more pressure has been put on institutional investors to be 
more active in their ownership, e.g. to exercise their proxies and their voting rights at the firms’ 
general meetings. Furthermore, it has been advocated that institutional investors may facilitate the 
promise of “relationship investing” (see e.g. Blair (1995)), which describes a situation where they are 
engaged in overseeing management in the long term instead of being detached or passive.  
Due to the separation of ownership and control, agency costs exist, as investors are not able to monitor 
management without incurring costs. This is foreseen by the external providers of capital, so even if 
management has identified projects with positive net present value, it may find it difficult to convince 
capital suppliers to invest their wealth in the firm. A statement where management promises not to 
exploit the firm’s resources is in the terminology of game theory, simply not credible. Moreover, when 
institutional investors hold a substantial proportion of shares, this might discipline management, since 
the free rider problem associated with dispersed ownership would be alleviated. Contrary to small 
investors, institutional investors are more able to absorb the costs from monitoring management and 
engaging in active ownership. 
One the other hand, one may argue that if all small investors believe that institutional investors will 
undertake the monitoring role, the free rider problem may be enhanced. The reason is that this would 
destroy the incentives for small investors to play any active role at all.  
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Proponents of institutional activism argue that strengthening institutional investors’ ownership would 
benefit society as a whole, because they would be able to influence managerial actions, so that the 
interests of the society and the company more coincides, see e.g. Black (1992), as well as Monks and 
Minow (1995) for this view.   
At first glance, this may appear as a satisfactory solution. However, this neglects the fact that there are 
other remedies to mitigate externalities imposed by a firm on its surroundings, which might turn out 
more adequate. Recall the famous Coase theorem, which states that given the absence of transaction 
costs, parties will negotiate and reach an efficient bargaining solution. Property rights will be assigned 
to the party, who is most willing to pay for a specific right, e.g. a right to pollute the firm’s 
surroundings or abstain from such an activity. Instead of letting institutional investors influence 
managerial decisions, it might prove more efficient to remove impediments, so that management may 
bargain with the firm’s stakeholders, see e.g. Rose (2004) who argues for a narrow duty of loyalty for 
management, emphasizing the contractua l approach between management and the firm’s stakeholders.  
Institutional investors cover a wide group of heterogeneous investors, which are all subjected to 
different legislations. They include pension funds, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, mutual 
companies and investment funds/foundations. Some of the largest institutional investors have all been 
very active in exercising their rights as owners, e.g. CalPERS, the New York City pension fund, 
TIAA-CREF. They have sought e.g. to challenge excessive executive compensation, the adoption of 
takeover defences, to split the roles of chairman and CEO and to ensure enough independent directors. 
However, generally, institutional activism has been limited. The reason is that regulation often puts 
various restrictions on the ownership by institutional investors, such as, requiring them not to have a 
dominant stock holding in a firm.  
In Denmark, the largest two institutional investors (ATP and LD) have been very active in the debate 
on corporate governance pointing out, what they regard, as weaknesses embedded in the Danish 
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corporate governance system. For instance, both investors have criticised the use of shares with dual 
class voting rights, which are very common in Denmark, as well as been reluctant towards foundation 
ownership, emphasizing the lack of transparency associated with foundation ownership.   
Denmark got its own guidelines or code of corporate governance in December 2001, based on a report 
made by the so-called Nørby committee, which was revised in December 2003 (the director of ATP, 
Lars Rohde is a member of the committee). Thus, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange requires all listed 
firms to follow the recommendations or to explain if a company does not comply with the 
recommendations. Contrary to e.g. the Combined Code, the Danish Nørby report does not contain any 
recommendations concerning the role of institutional investors. The Combined Code states that 
companies should be ready, where practicable, to enter into a dialogue with institutional investors 
based on the mutual understanding of objectives. Thus, the Combined Code mentions that institutional 
shareholders should have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes. As more attention is 
drawn to the role of institutional investors, this naturally spurs the need to understand the economic 
consequences of institutional ownership. 
This article finds that institutional investors are not able to solve the corporate governance problem. 
Specifically, using a sample of Danish listed firms during 1998-2001 and applying 3SLS, it is found 
that aggregate ownership by institutional investors on overall, does not impact performance measured 
by Tobin’s q. Using piecewise regression, it is shown that ownership by institutiona l investors 
between zero and 10 percent, significantly influences firm performance negatively. On the other hand, 
ownership between 10 and 33 percent, as well as over 33 percent, does not impact performance 
significantly. However, decomposing the results reveals that the joint ownership by the two largest 
Danish institutional investors has a significant, negative impact on firm performance. On the other 
hand, the analysis shows that ownership by banks and to a lesser extent insurance companies has a 
positive, significant impact on firm performance.  
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The results, somehow, challenge the conventional wisdom, arguing that the black box view of 
institutional investors should be abandoned. It is suggested that a more careful analysis should be 
devoted to the assessment of the legal impediments for institutional activism. It is also argued that 
more attention should be drawn to the design of incentive schemes for fund managers employed by 
institutional investors, in order to mitigate agency costs within the organiza tion of institutional 
investors.    
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, I motivate the hypothesis followed by a 
literature review in section 3. The data is described in section 4, and section 5 outlines the 
methodology. Results are shown in section 6 followed by a discussion in section 7. The article ends 
with a short conclusion in section 8.  
 
2. Hypothesis 
As mentioned, institutional investors may reduce the free rider problem caused by dispersed 
ownership and therefore avoid managerial focus on short-termism. For instance, small investors may 
find it more difficult to form coalitions, or to enforce their rights in courts. The article tests the 
following hypothesis empirically.  
 
Firm performance increases when institutional investors increase their ownership 
 
Furthermore, one may hypothesize that institutional investors could influence management, not only to 
take the interests of shareholders into account, but also to serve the interests of other stakeholders. To 
illustrate, consider e.g. a pension fund, where all the members have strong preferences against firms 
that directly or indirectly use child labor. Even if such firms may earn a higher profit due to lower 
costs, it might be reasonable for a pension fund not to invest in such firms, due to the members’ strong 
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preferences against the use of child labor. Another question is, if it is optimal from the perspective of 
society, i.e. if no children were allowed to work, and as a result instead died of starvation. In other 
words, institutional investors may consider a broader view, trying to get management not only to care 
about the shareholders’ interests, which to some extent can be justified, since shareholders are usually 
considered residual claimants, see e.g. Fama and French (1983).  
On the other hand, one could argue that enhanced ownership by institutional investors does not 
necessarily influence performance positively. Specifically, it is doubtful that institutional investors act, 
as if they have a long investment horizon. The reason is that a portfolio manager employed by 
institutional investors is evaluated yearly, by comparing each portfolio manager’s performance, with a 
selected peer group or benchmark. As a consequence, the portfolio manager might care less about the 
return from their investment s in the future thirty years from now when the pension costumer intends to 
enjoy the capital accumulation. Put differently, there is an embedded agency problem within 
institutional investors.  
Furthermore, it is also questionable whether institutional investors would always act in a way that 
benefits all investor groups. Naturally, managements in listed firms need to care about the preferences 
of the large shareholders, since they are the owners and could replace incumbent management at the 
forthcoming general meeting. If institutional investors hold a high stake in a company, there is an 
inherent risk that institutional investors might seek to derive private benefits on behalf on all the other 
minority shareholders. For instance, institutional investors might get inside information, when 
management holds investor meetings or is in contact with the dominant owners. Even though, this is 
prohibited by law, it is still quite difficult to prove afterwards by the authorities. Collusion between 
large block holders and management may be sanctioned by the law, since this could violate the 
principle of the equal treatment of shareholders that prevails in the legislation of most countries, 
including Danish company law.  
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The legal protection of (minority) shareholders plays a key role in corporate governance, see e.g. La 
Porta et al. (1997), who find that countries with poorer investor protection, including protection of 
minority shareholders, have smaller and narrower capital markets.  
The opinion that institutional investors acting as active owners could discipline management may also 
be ambiguous, as institutional investors often are impeded by legal restrictions, and consequently they 
do not qualify as active owners. For instance, in some countries, such as the US, banks and insurance 
companies are not allowed to hold large portions of equity in non-financial firms, see Blair (1995) for 
a review of US institutional investors. This is contrary to Germany, where banks play a major role, not 
only as owners, because the German legislation prescribes that, if a shareholder does not actively 
require the right to vote for himself, the voting right is automatically transferred to the bank. German 
bank directors are also allowed to seat on the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) in non-financial firms. 
Contrary to the Danish system, the German institutional framework, therefore, especially supports the 
influence on banks. 
In addition, the presence of large institutional owners might even enhance the free rider problem, since 
smaller investors would rely on institutional investors to monitor and control management, so they 
would not spend resources doing these activities themselves. Monitoring and controlling management 
is costly, so in order to save these costs, institutional investors may facilitate an index tracking 
strategy. This involves a passive investment strategy, and if capital markets are efficient, stock picking 
would be wasteful. Thus, if institutional investors hold efficient portfolios, they have eliminated the 
firm specific risk by diversification and very rarely have a motive to act as active owners.    
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3. Literature 
Several theoretical papers explore how ownership influences managerial incentives. Grossman and 
Hart (1980) derive a formal model, where they show that small investors do not have a big enough 
stake in the firm to absorb the costs of watching the management.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1987) formulate a model where they show that when a large shareholder 
increases his holdings, a takeover becomes more likely and as a result, the firm’s share price increases. 
Moreover, when a takeover does occur, the premium is lower, because when a large shareholder owns 
more, he is willing to take over for a smaller increase in the firm’s profit. Bids do not only signal a 
smaller increase in average post takeover profits, but bids also become more likely and are more 
heavily reflected in the pre takeover market price. Shleifer and Vishny (1987) further show that an 
increase in the legal and administrative costs of takeovers, reduces the welfare of small investors, 
despite an increase in the takeover premium.  
Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994) study large shareholder activism and risk sharing in financial 
markets. Their model relies on a traditional asset pricing model with a number of risky securities as 
well as a risk free asset. They assume that investors are risk averse, but their model only assumes that 
there is one single large investor. Moreover, they show that in a portfolio context large shareholder 
activism is consistent with equilibrium, even if the initial holdings of the large shareholder are zero.    
Maug (1998) analyzes how market liquidity influences the free rider problem. He develops a model, 
where he shows that a more liquid market leads to more monitoring, because it allows an investor to 
cover monitoring costs through informed trading. If stock markets are less liquid, large shareholders 
will engage in less monitoring. In order to avoid the commitment to monitor, the large shareholder will 
have smaller stakes in more companies by diversification. 
Kahn and Winton (1998) analyze how speculation influences institutional intervention. They argue 
that intervention increases the value of the institution’s existing shares, but they show that intervention 
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only increases the institution’s trading profit, if it enhances the precision of the institution’s 
information, compared to the uninformed investors. They show that when costs of intervention fall, 
more informed traders enter the market, making prices more informative, diminishing the institution’s 
trading profits, and thus reducing the importance of trading profits in the institutions intervention 
decision. Also, as intervention becomes more likely to succeed, or the impact of successful 
intervention increases, the trading impact increases in importance.  
One of their policy implications is that concentration levels should be higher in relatively transparent 
well-understood firms or industries, than in firms or industries that are less transparent, i.e. where 
information is harder to obtain.  
Hartzell and Starks (2003) argue that institutional investors serve a monitoring role in mitigating the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders. Specifically, they find that institutional 
ownership is positively related to the pay for performance sensitivity of executive compensation, and 
negatively related to the level of compensations. The result is robust when they control for firm size, 
industry and investment opportunities.  
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) challenge  the notion that the reduction of managerial discretion 
by large outside investors is purely beneficial. They construct a model, where they show that outside 
ownership comes with costs and benefits. Specifically, they show that even though, tight control by 
outside shareholders may be ex post efficient, it also constitutes an ex ante expropriation threat that 
reduces the level of non-contractible investment by managers. The underlying reason is that a 
dispersed ownership structure commits shareholders not to exercise excessive control. One of the 
consequences of their model is that monitoring can reduce the effectiveness of incentive schemes 
based on performance. 
Duggal, R. and J. Millar (1999) empirically challenge the ability of institutional investors to monitor 
management. Based on takeover decisions during 1985-1990, they examine the impact of institutional 
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ownership and performance, but they do not find evidence that active institutional investors, as a 
group, enhance efficiency in the market for corporate control. Duggal and Millar also identify a 
number of institutional investors that have a reputation for exercising an active ownership, but 
regressing bidder returns against active institutional investors only result in an insignificant 
relationship.  
On the other hand, Wahal and McConnell (2000) find no support for the contention that institutional 
investors cause managers to behave myopically. Based on a large sample from 1988-1994 of US firms, 
they document a positive relation between industry adjusted capital expenditures, as well as research 
and development, and the proportion of shares he ld by institutional investors. Both are proxies for 
management’s degree of long-term orientation.  
Prevost and Rao (2000) study whether institutional investor activism benefits shareholders, using an 
event study of shareholder proposals surrounding proxy mailing dates. Contrary to earlier studies, they 
find a strong negative wealth effect surrounding the proxy mailing dates of firms targeted by two very 
visible, publicity-seeking types of sponsors: CalPERS and coalitions of public funds sponsoring or co-
sponsoring one or more proposals on the same proxy. Prevost and Rao argue that the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that a formal proposal submission signals a breakdown in the 
negotiation process between the funds and management.  
Louis, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) examine the price effect of institutional stock trading and they 
find that the average effect is small. They also document market asymmetry between price impact of 
buys versus sells, which is related to various hypotheses on the elasticity of demand for stocks, the 
costs of executing transactions and the determinants of market impact. For instance, they argue that 
institutional purchase might be a stronger signal of favourable information, whereas there are many 
liquidity motivated reasons to dispose a stock, see also Sias and Starks (1997) for an analysis of return 
autocorrelation and institutional investors. 
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Bhagat, Black and Blair (2004) conduct a large study of ownership and performance over a thirteen 
year period focusing on, whether relationship investing has a positive impact on firm performance. 
They document a significant secular increase in large block shareholding with a sharp percentage 
increase in these holdings by mutual funds, partnerships, investment advisors and employee pension 
plans. However, most institutional investors, when they purchase large blocks, sell the blocks 
relatively quickly afterwards. Bhagat, Black and Blair provide a mixed result of whether relational 
investing affects firm performance. In the late 1980s, where there was a high takeover wave, there was 
a significant relation between relational investing and firm performance, but this pattern was not found 
in the other periods. In essence, they do not find any persistent and sustainable effect of relational 
investing on firm performance. Thus, they argue that the idea of relational investing must be more 
carefully specified in theory.  
Ackert and Athanassakos (2001) focus on agency considerations among institutional investors. They 
show that market frictions are important concerns for institutional investors, when they make portfolio 
allocation decisions. The availability of information about a firm is a significant friction, so that 
institutional holding increases with market value and the firm’s visibility, as proxied by the number of 
analysts following the firm. They also show that institutions adjust their portfolios away from highly 
visible firms at the beginning of the year, but increase their holdings in these firms as the year-end 
approaches, which is, as they argue, consistent with the gamesmanship hypothesis.  
In contrast to several other studies that focus on firm level effects of institutiona l ownership, Davis 
(2002) examines how institutional share holding in the largest countries on aggregate affect macro 
economies. Specifically, Davis links the development of institutional investors to important indicators 
of corporate sector performance, such as increasing dividend distribution, less fixed investment and 
higher productivity growth. Life insures and Pension funds are most influential.   
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Neumann and Voetmann (2003) carry out  an event study measuring the impact on share prices from 
strategic and institutional investors at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. They find that changes in 
ownership matter. Moreover, they find that when large institutional and strategic investor’s ownership 
is high i.e. beyond 20 percent, the security performance decreases, whereas between 5 and 20 percent 
threshold security performance remains constant. Only when changes in ownership are between zero 
and 5 percent, security performance increases. The authors attribute this relation to increasing 
entrenchment benefits when ownership passes the high threshold.  
 
4. Data 
The data consist of a unique sample of all Danish firms listed at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
during 1998-2001. Banks and insurance companies are excluded, as well as a few number of football 
clubs due to the difficulty calculating Tobin’s q for these firms (there are special accounting rules for 
these sectors). In addition, six companies from the sample are also excluded due to lack of relevant 
data, including the large Shipping companies D/S Svendborg and D/S 1912 (now merged as the APM 
Group). The latter is a consequence of the non-transparent ownership structure of these two firms 
during the considered period. 
The primary source of data consists of the firms’ annual accounts, i.e. the financial data is obtained by 
manually collecting each firm’s annual accounts for each year. Stock market information is obtained 
from The Copenhagen Stock Exchange (www.cse.dk). Stock market data is corrected for new stock 
issues and splits. All financial ratios are calculated in accordance with the recommendations made by 
the Danish Association of Financial Analysts (DAF).  
A small proportion of firms do not report the exact amount of blockholders (owning more than 5 
percent), so the actual number of blockholders may be underestimated in the data. Furthermore, if a 
company holds shares of its own, this amount is excluded from the data, since a company is not 
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entitled to vote on their own shares according to Danish Law. Thus, if an investor holds shares through 
a company he controls, this is included as his/her holding regardless of the company’s legal entity. 
This gives a sample of 443 firm-time observations. However, 9 firms had Tobin’s q that exceeds 5 
(typically newly listed technology stocks), so these (outliers) firms have been excluded from the 
analysis reducing the sample size to 434 firms. Based on the data, the article constructs the following 
variables. 
 
LIST OF VARIABLES 
The abbreviations in the parentheses are labels used in the correlation matrix. 
 
- TOBIN’Q (q): The market value of equity plus book value of debt all divided with book value 
of assets 
- INSTI: Cumulative ownership of all institutional investors without foreign investors 
- INSUR: Ownership by insurance companies 
- BANK: Ownership by banks  
- INVEST: Ownership by mutual funds 
- PENS: Ownership by pension funds 
- LDATP: Ownership by ATP (Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension) and LD (Lønmodtagernes 
Dyrtidsfond) 
- FOREIGN: Foreign ownership 
- TRUSTS: Ownership by trusts or foundations 
- DUALCL: Dummy variable equal to 1, if firms have shares with dual class voting rights 
- SIZE (SIZE): Net turnover for the group 
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- OPTIONS (OPT): Dummy variable equals one if the firm has granted management incentive 
contracts, otherwise it equals zero 
- LnCAPEXP: The natual log of net capital expenses 
- TRADE/SERVICE (TS): Dummy variable equals one, if a firm belongs to the trade and 
service industry, otherwise it equals zero 
- MANUFACTORING (MAF): Dummy variable if a firm belongs to the manufacturing 
industry, otherwise it equals zero  
- SHIPPING (SHIP): Dummy variable equals one, if a firm belongs to the shipping industry, 
otherwise it equals zero 
 
5. Methodology 
This paper conducts a cross-sectional regression analysis, where all the firm’s observations during the 
period are staged. Tobin’s q is used to measure firm performance, which is a measure of the firm’s 
ability to generate profits above the replacement value of the existing assets in the firm. A high value 
of q is usually a strong indication for valuable growth opportunities, due to a strong competitive 
advantage. Despite the drawbacks of Tobin’s  q, it is often applied in corporate governance. In 
particular, it is dubious whether the de-nominator in the q ratio, is an adequate proxy for the firm’s 
replacement costs. 
The proportion of ownership by institutional investors serves as the key explanatory variable and the 
following control variables are also included: Presence of incentive contracts, firm size, industry 
dummies as well as year dummies. 
When performing simple OLS, one assumes that firm performance is the only endogenous variable, 
i.e. ownership by institutional investors influences firm performance. However, as recognized in the 
corporate governance literature, the causation may go in the opposite direction, i.e. firm performance 
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may impact ownership by institutional investors. As a consequence, both Tobin’s q and institutional 
ownership may be regarded as endogenous variables. Technically speaking, OLS assumes the 
regressors are uncorrelated with the residual, but when current endogenous variables appear as 
regressors in other equations, this assumption is violated and OLS parameter estimates are biased.  
To remedy this problem, one may construct a simultaneous equation system where the equations are 
estimated us ing instrumental variables. Instruments are by definition unrelated to the endogenous 
variables, and any variables that are thought to be exogenous and independent of the disturbance are 
able to serve as instruments. However, as is argued by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), 
insufficient instruments make it difficult to establish a robust relation between ownership and 
performance.  
The article uses four instruments, namely OPTIONS and lnCAPEXP serving as instruments for 
Tobin’s q. There is reason to believe that when management receives incentive contracts, this will help 
to alleviate agency costs thereby impacting firm performance positively. At the same time, it seems 
unlikely that institutional investors may influence the decision to offer incentive contracts to ´the 
management. The second instrument is the natural log of net capital expenditures. It is reasonable to 
expect that when a firm pays a higher amount of capital expenditures, this may reflect that the firm has 
undertaken more profitable investment opportunities, which influence performance positively. Thus, 
when management is forced to repay more debt, the free cash flow may be reduced, as suggested by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), which would alleviate agency costs. 
Foundation ownership is widespread in Denmark and there has been much discussion for and against 
foundation ownership, as it seems to violate the classical principal agent model. A foundation does not 
have any owners and the board is self selective. Very often the proceeds are denoted to charities, so at 
first sight, foundation ownership seems to conflict with the neoclassical assumption about the profit 
maximizing firm. Thus, foundation ownership may hamper market liquidity, since the shares held by 
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the foundation very often are not traded at all. Therefore, institutional investors would be less 
interested in buying shares in firms with substantial foundation ownership.  
This is also the case for firms relying on shares with dual class voting rights. The reason is that very 
often a foundation holds the shares with the superior voting rights, whereas the normal shares are 
traded at the stock exchange. This has also been recognized by the largest Danish institutional 
investors, which have publicly expressed their critique against the use of shares with dual class voting 
rights, which are very common in Denmark. In addition,  recent studies show that foundation 
ownership, as well as the presence of takeover defenses do not impact firm performance, see Thomsen 
and Rose (2004) and Rose (2002). This article makes use of 3SLS taking into account the correlation 
between the residuals in the equations (all calculations are done in SAS) 
 
6. Results 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the sample. Notice that the aggregate average ownership in a 
firm by institutional investors is 19 percent.  
 
             [INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
 
Compared to other industrialized countries, ownership by Danish institutional investors seems to be 
relatively low. Banks and insurance companies own a low proportion of equity of Danish listed firms 
and this is especially true for mutual funds (investeringsforeninger), which only account for less than 
one percent in a firm. 
Pension funds own on average just above three percent, which in an international perspective seems   
as a moderate ownership stake, although the maximum ownership percent is high, more precisely 81 
percent. The dominance by the two largest institutional shareholders is striking, since they account for 
more than ten percent on average and are by far the two most important players.  
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A plausible reason, why Danish institutional investors are less dominant owners than their foreign 
colleagues might be that the Danish welfare system provides social benefits, when people retire from 
the work force or leave the workforce for other reasons. This may hamper people’s incentives to 
invest, e.g. in pension funds. However, there are other legal impediments that restrict the ownership by 
Danish institutional investors, especially for banks and for insurance companies.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
Table 2 depicts the correlation matrix of the variables (a few variables have been omitted due to space 
limitations). It is interesting to notice that there is a high negative significant correlation between 
Tobin’s q and aggregate ownership by institutional investors as well as mutual funds, pension funds 
and ATPLD. Notice also that foreign ownership, which may include foreign institutional investors and 
aggregate ownership by Danish institutional investors, is significantly negatively correlated. Thus, 
firm size is high positively correlated with the ownership by ATP and LD. There is also a negative 
significant correlation between ownership by those two institutions and foreign ownership.  
The result of the regression analysis using 3SLS is displayed in table 3 where both Tobin’s q and the 
aggregate ownership by Danish institutional investors serve as endogenous variables. In the following, 
only results of the first structural equation are displayed. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Table 3 reveals that aggregate ownership by Danish institutional investors influences firm 
performance negatively, although not significantly. The control variable OPTIONS is positive and 
significantly different from zero. Firm size also significantly impacts firm performance, although 
negatively, which is also the case for the shipping industry dummy (measured against the 
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manufacturing industry), although only on a 10 percent level. None of the year dummies are 
significant (measured against 1998). Using non linear 3SLS, where the variable INST is squared (the 
coefficient is still negative), as well as raised to the second power (positive coefficient), does not 
change the results either, i.e. aggregate ownership by institutional investors does not impact firm 
performance significantly.  There is reason to believe that it matters, if an institutional investor 
increases his holding from 9-10 percent, compared to an increase from 8-9 percent. The reason is that 
when ownership passes certain thresholds, a shareholder obtains certain specific minority rights 
granted by the Danish Company Act. For instance, when a shareholder owns at least 10 percent, he 
may call for an extraordinary general meeting, demand a minority auditor or an investigation of the 
firms financial status, etc. Pursuant to Danish law, changing the company’s articles of incorporation 
needs the approval by two thirds of the votes and the represented capital at the general meeting. As a 
consequence, a shareholder holding 34 percent may block such amendments, and thereby resist any 
fundamental change in the company’s status. This analysis follows the approach formulated by 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) uncovering, if the effect is influenced by the current 
ownership level (piece wise regression).  
Table 4 reveals that there is a significant negative effect on performance when aggregate institutional 
shareholding is increased in the range from zero to 10 percent. However, this picture is not maintained 
in the ownership intervals of 10-33 percent as well as above 33 percent (not shown in the article) 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
Table 5 reveals an interesting relation, namely that ownership by the two largest institutional investors 
in Denmark, i.e. LD and ATP, impacts firm performance negatively. Both control variables, LNSIZE, 
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and OPTIONS, are also significantly different from zero. This is also the case when the variable 
LDATP is squared hypothesising a concave relationship between firm performance and ownership. 
The coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero (the results in the latter situation are 
not shown in the article). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
  
Table 6 shows that ownership by pension funds does not influence firm performance. The dummy 
variable in year 2001 is significant, which is also the case for the variables SIZE and SHIP. Notice, 
however that the estimated equation does not explain much of the variation in the data, since one 
cannot reject that all the coefficients are zero. Therefore, the evidence suggests that ownership by 
pension funds does not influence firm performance.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
Table 7 shows the effect on firm performance from an increase in the ownership by mutual funds 
(investeringsforeninger). The coefficient is negative and significant on a ten percent level.  The 
following control variables are all significantly different from zero: OPTIONS, SHIP, SIZE, 
YEAR2000 and YEAR2001. The Variable INVEST is also significant, when taking the squared root 
of INVETS (not shown in the article).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
The next table shows how ownership by banks influences firm performance. Table 8 reveals that 
contrary to the previous results, banks have a positive significant impact on firm performance. The 
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coefficient is 0,115 and the significance level is below five percent. The following control variables 
are also significantly different from zero: OPTIONS, SHIP and to a lesser extent also TRADE. This is 
repeated, when some of the control variables are excluded from the equation, since BANK remains 
significantly different from zero and positive. This is also the case when the variable BANK is 
squared, c.f. the lower part of table 8. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
The effect of ownership by insurance companies on firm performance is depicted in table 9. The 
variable INSUR is positive and significantly different from zero on a ten percent level. The following 
control variables are also significant: OPTIONS, SHIP and SIZE. The results are insignificant when 
taking the square root of INSUR. Notice, however that the estimated equation only accounts for a 
relatively low degree of the variation of firm performance, although this is not unusual in cross-
sectional models of firm performance. Ownership by foreigners does not influence firm performance. 
Running four separate regressions does not change the results. This is also the case when I estimate the 
regression but use an indicator variable for each firm since firm year observations may not be 
independent.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
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7. Discussion  
 
As shown, the formulated hypothesis must be rejected, as one cannot content that institutional 
investors may discipline managers in order to run the firm more in the interests of shareholders and 
thereby maximizing profit. There might be several reasons why aggregate ownership by Danish 
institutional investors does not impact performance. First, one cannot take it for certain that 
institutional investors are effective enough to coordinate their actions that are necessary to put real 
pressure on the incumbent management. Even though, there are no legal constraints, such as in the US, 
for large shareholders to coordinate their actions against management, institutional investors might 
disagree on how management should be challenged. At the same time, it is an open question, if the 
institutional investors have necessary power to challenge management, as they often hold the shares 
with the inferior voting rights (the B shares). 
LD and ATP were both founded by law more than a decade ago. LD was formed because in the 
seventies the government decided not to compensate employees’ wages for the increase of inflation. 
Instead, the government declared that the amount should be laid in the hand of a fund that would 
invest the money, and later on people would be compensated. ATP was also founded by the 
government in order to increase the pension payments made by all Danish employees. The results 
support the view that enhancing the ownership by the two largest institutional owners does not 
influence firm performance positively. On the other hand, it seems implausible to suspect that these 
two investors deprive private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders or to allege that LD 
and ATP diminish firm value. Moreover, the results seem to indicate that their pressure was not 
sufficient to change corporate policy in a direction that could strengthen the process of value, creation 
i.e. shareholder value. In recent years, both ATP and LD have been very active in exercising their 
ownership, adopting several of the principles formulated in the Danish code of good corporate 
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governance, i.e. the Nørby report. Therefore, it seems as an obvious task for future research in this 
area to uncover, if the negative relation, which is found in this analysis, at present still prevails. 
As mentioned, legal impediments may hamper the activism of institutional investors. To illustrate, the 
Act that governs ATP and LD contains in paragraph 6(3) a statement requiring both funds not to own 
equities in a given firm, if they become dominant owners, e.g. when they are in a position to elect all 
the members on the supervisory board etc.  
Banks and insurance companies are also restricted, since Danish law puts some restrictions on their 
ability to own non-financial firms. The Act (Lov om Finansiel Virksomhed) states in paragraph 24 that 
banks and insurance companies can be allowed by the authorities to operate firms, which businesses 
are accessory to these firms. However, they are allowed to own equity in any firm, as long that they do 
not have a dominant ownership position (paragraph 26). Legal restrictions may, therefore, be a serious 
constraint in the ability of institutional investors to exercise active ownership.  
The results show that increased ownership by banks and insurance companies increase firm 
performance. Due to the legal impediments faced by banks and insurance companies, they are not 
allowed to be active owners hence a possible explanation for the results may be that both types of 
firms are able to make superior investments in listed firms (recall that the ownership held by banks and 
insurance companies is relatively small). Specifically, it might be the case that portfolio managers 
employed by banks are subjected to a more competitive performance pressure from top bank officers.  
One of the policy implications of the articles finding is that more attention should be devoted to 
mitigate the principal-agent problem within the organization of institutional investors. More precisely, 
one should pay attention to how an institutional investor’s supervisory board provides incentives to 
portfolio managers, so that they benefit from their active ownership on behalf of the fund. 
Recall, that agency theory states that if a manager is supposed to carry out two different tasks, the 
marginal benefit to the agent must be equal, otherwise he/she will simply neglect the task with the 
 23 
lowest marginal benefit. Portfolio managers hired by institutional investors should therefore be 
rewarded financially, if they participate in active ownership, e.g. representing the funds equity 
holdings at the general meeting and when being active in monitoring and controlling management.  
Moreover, institutional investors should not be treated as a homogenous group of investors, but should 
be analysed separately, focusing on each institutional investor’s ability to engage in active ownership, 
and how this is accomplished at the lowest costs. This might involve a more formal coordination 
procedure when exercising their ownership stakes between institutional investors, which might include 
a specialization among the institutional investors.     
 
9. Conclusion  
 
Ownership by institutional investors has become especially widespread in recent years, hence 
institutional investors have become the capitalists of our time. Thus, this urges the question of whether 
this development benefits investors in the first place. In particular, shareholders who are constraint 
from exercising their property rights due to the free rider problem associated with dispersed 
ownership.    
This article tests the hypothesis that increased ownership by institutional investors’ impact firm 
performance positively. The hypothesis must be rejected, but decomposing the results reveals that 
ownership by banks and to a lesser extent insurance companies has a positive significant impact on 
firm performance measured by Tobin’s q. The largest two institutional investors in Denmark, ATP and 
LD, have a negative significant impact on firm performance during the period of the sample covering 
the years; 1998-2001. It is suggested that more attention should be paid to the design of incentive 
contracts within institutional investors in order to mitigate the agency problems.  
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It is an open question whether the results of the article can be generalized to other European countries 
or are robust over a long-term period of time. Moreover, the article tries to uncover the black box view 
of institutional investors showing that different institutional investors may impact managerial 
incentives differently, and as a consequence, it contributes to the debate on the role of institutional 
investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Label Maximum Mean Minimum N Std Dev 
Q 
INST 
INSUR 
BANK 
INVEST 
PENS 
LDATP 
FOREIGN 
OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 
LNSIZE 
DUALCL 
TRUST 
Q 
INST 
INSUR 
BANK 
INVEST 
PENS 
LDATP 
FOREIGN 
OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 
LNSIZE 
DUALCL 
TRUST 
4.8889538 
89.8600000 
33.8700000 
42.0100000 
25.0400000 
80.9500000 
34.4700000 
100.0000000 
1.0000000 
8.1297644 
10.8505790 
1.0000000 
79.1000000 
1.1708957 
19.0706682 
2.2590323 
2.3472055 
0.8860829 
3.2468664 
10.3368894 
4.9218433 
0.3686636 
2.7919239 
6.7885836 
0.4585253 
5.9954608 
0.3326603 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.8824036 
0 
0 
0 
434 
434 
434 
433 
434 
434 
434 
434 
434 
434 
434 
434 
434 
0.6799575 
17.4727417 
5.0813831 
5.7414053 
3.3763273 
9.0242465 
9.3218008 
13.4851739 
0.4829993 
1.9222855 
1.8009310 
0.4988519 
13.5202054 
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        Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0  
Number of Observations 
 Q INST  INSUR BANK INVEST  PENS LDATP FOREIGN LNSIZE 
Q 
Q 
1.00000 
 
443 
        
INST  
INST  
-0.15102 
0.0014 
443 
1.00000 
 
443 
       
INSUR 
INSUR 
-0.05143 
0.2801 
443 
0.46913 
<.0001 
443 
1.00000 
 
443 
      
BANK 
BANK 
-0.02746 
0.5647 
442 
0.54599 
<.0001 
442 
0.27861 
<.0001 
442 
1.00000 
 
442 
     
INVEST  
INVEST  
-0.08087 
0.0891 
443 
0.32000 
<.0001 
443 
0.11006 
0.0205 
443 
-0.03351 
0.4822 
442 
1.00000 
 
443 
    
PENS 
PENS 
-0.11421 
0.0162 
443 
0.49973 
<.0001 
443 
-0.03366 
0.4798 
443 
0.00928 
0.8457 
442 
0.02435 
0.6093 
443 
1.00000 
 
443 
   
LDATP 
LDATP 
-0.09918 
0.0369 
443 
0.68729 
<.0001 
443 
0.15678 
0.0009 
443 
0.26181 
<.0001 
442 
0.17651 
0.0002 
443 
-0.02280 
0.6322 
443 
1.00000 
 
443 
  
FOREIGN 
FOREIGN 
-0.03018 
0.5263 
443 
-0.14695 
0.0019 
443 
-0.06569 
0.1675 
443 
-0.06159 
0.1962 
442 
-0.03016 
0.5266 
443 
-0.06790 
0.1537 
443 
-0.12582 
0.0080 
443 
1.00000 
 
443 
 
LNSIZE 
LNSIZE 
-0.02991 
0.5301 
443 
0.07097 
0.1358 
443 
0.00876 
0.8542 
443 
0.00004 
0.9994 
442 
-0.05758 
0.2265 
443 
-0.10965 
0.0210 
443 
0.25466 
<.0001 
443 
0.07444 
0.1177 
443 
1.00000 
 
443 
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Table 3. 3SLS of Tobin’s q with instruments: OPTIONS and LNCAPEXP. Instruments for INST  
 are DUALCL and TRUST. Adjusted R2 is equal to 5,6 percent and the F value is 3,86. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 1.715184 0.244935 7.00 <.0001 Intercept 
INST 1 -0.00722 0.010334 -0.70 0.4852 INST 
OPTIONS 1 0.291349 0.075146 3.88 0.0001 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 0.012047 0.031770 0.38 0.7047 LNCAPEXP 
TRADE 1 -0.05344 0.072380 -0.74 0.4607 TRADE 
SHIP 1 -0.28904 0.168435 -1.72 0.0869 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.07637 0.032099 -2.38 0.0178 LNSIZE 
YEAR1999 1 -0.01376 0.087851 -0.16 0.8756 YEAR1999 
YEAR2000 1 0.044428 0.087891 0.51 0.6135 YEAR2000 
YEAR2001 1 -0.03077 0.089000 -0.35 0.7297 YEAR2001 
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Table 4. 3SLS of Tobin’s q with instruments: OPTIONS and LNCAPEXP. Instruments for INST0-
10 are DUALCL and TRUST. Adjusted R2 is equal to 5,8 percent and the F value is 3,99. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 2.055828 0.257634 7.98 <.0001 Intercept 
INST0-10 1 -0.07232 0.037842 -1.91 0.0567 INST1 
OPTIONS 1 0.220744 0.073974 2.98 0.0030 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 -0.00931 0.033936 -0.27 0.7840 LNCAPEXP 
TRADE 1 -0.09261 0.077788 -1.19 0.2345 TRADE 
SHIP 1 -0.31926 0.182288 -1.75 0.0806 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.05831 0.026088 -2.24 0.0259 LNSIZE 
YEAR1999 1 0.012165 0.070929 0.17 0.8639 YEAR1999 
YEAR2000 1 0.089225 0.070957 1.26 0.2093 YEAR2000 
YEAR2001 1 0.026956 0.071838 0.38 0.7077 YEAR2001 
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Table 5. 3SLS of Tobin’s q with instruments: OPTIONS and LNCAPEXP. Instruments for LDATP  
 are DUALCL and TRUST. Adjusted R2 is equal to 5,7 percent and the F value is 9,84. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 2.119361 0.172593 12.28 <.0001 Intercept 
LDATP 1 -0.03338 0.014494 -2.30 0.0218 LDATP 
OPTIONS 1 0.230819 0.079010 2.92 0.0037 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 0.034776 0.032204 1.08 0.2808 LNCAPEXP 
TRADE 1 0.097959 0.065111 1.50 0.1332 TRADE 
SHIP 1 -0.18573 0.150508 -1.23 0.2179 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.12019 0.028636 -4.20 <.0001 LNSIZE 
YEAR1999 1 -0.00976 0.077520 -0.13 0.8999 YEAR1999 
YEAR2000 1 0.079638 0.077607 1.03 0.3054 YEAR2000 
YEAR2001 1 0.001119 0.078588 0.01 0.9887 YEAR2001 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 1.914964 0.117441 16.31 <.0001 Intercept 
LDATP 1 -0.02781 0.012016 -2.31 0.0211 LDATP 
OPTIONS 1 0.259923 0.069028 3.77 0.0002 OPTIONS 
LNSIZE 1 -0.08138 0.021044 -3.87 0.0001 LNSIZE 
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Table 6. 3SLS of Tobin’s q with instruments: OPTIONS and LNCAPEXP. Instruments for PENS  
 are DUALCL and TRUST. Adjusted R2 is close to zero percent and the F value is 0,85. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 1.745639 0.683554 2.55 0.0110 Intercept 
PENS 1 0.106078 0.124761 0.85 0.3957 PENS 
OPTIONS 1 0.428354 0.228982 1.87 0.0621 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 0.024051 0.073727 0.33 0.7444 LNCAPEXP 
TRADE 1 0.248130 0.109800 2.26 0.0243 TRADE 
SHIP 1 -0.62173 0.251554 -2.47 0.0138 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.14315 0.047960 -2.98 0.0030 LNSIZE 
YEAR1999 1 -0.19914 0.128961 -1.54 0.1233 YEAR1999 
YEAR2000 1 -0.22385 0.129059 -1.73 0.0836 YEAR2000 
YEAR2001 1 -0.38960 0.130701 -2.98 0.0030 YEAR2001 
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Table 7. 3SLS of Tobin’s q with instruments: OPTIONS and LNCAPEXP. Instruments for INVEST  
 are DUALCL and TRUST. Adjusted R2 is equal to 5,0 percent and the F value is 3,51. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 1.625242 0.151924 10.70 <.0001 Intercept 
INVEST 1 -0.09855 0.056466 -1.75 0.0817 INVEST 
OPTIONS 1 0.337069 0.089411 3.77 0.0002 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 0.002971 0.026984 0.11 0.9124 LNCAPEXP 
TRADE 1 0.047154 0.061729 0.76 0.4454 TRADE 
SHIP 1 -0.50980 0.142810 -3.57 0.0004 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.05218 0.027181 -1.92 0.0556 LNSIZE 
YEAR1999 1 -0.09245 0.073713 -1.25 0.2105 YEAR1999 
YEAR2000 1 -0.17025 0.073784 -2.31 0.0215 YEAR2000 
YEAR2001 1 -0.25828 0.074716 -3.46 0.0006 YEAR2001 
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Table 8. 3SLS of Tobin’s q with instruments: OPTIONS and LNCAPEXP. Instruments for BANK  
 are DUALCL and TRUST. Adjusted R2 is equal to 2,1 percent and the F value is 2,23. Below is 
displayed the results when the variable is squared. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 1.038503 0.191678 5.42 <.0001 Intercept 
BANK 1 0.115454 0.047109 2.45 0.0147 BANK 
OPTIONS 1 0.226373 0.104687 2.16 0.0312 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 -0.01863 0.029001 -0.64 0.5210 LNCAPEXP 
TRADE 1 -0.10762 0.064163 -1.68 0.0942 TRADE 
SHIP 1 -0.64109 0.146448 -4.38 <.0001 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.01101 0.027948 -0.39 0.6938 LNSIZE 
YEAR1999 1 -0.00366 0.075168 -0.05 0.9612 YEAR1999 
YEAR2000 1 -0.06881 0.075215 -0.91 0.3608 YEAR2000 
YEAR2001 1 -0.07810 0.076243 -1.02 0.3062 YEAR2001 
  
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 0.998010 0.102609 9.73 <.0001 Intercept 
SQBANK 1 0.269332 0.141476 1.90 0.0576 SQBANK 
OPTIONS 1 0.292622 0.083769 3.49 0.0005 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 -0.04270 0.017920 -2.38 0.0176 LNCAPEXP 
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Table 9. 3SLS of Tobin’s q with instruments: OPTIONS and LNCAPEXP. Instruments for INSUR  
 are DUALCL and TRUST. Adjusted R2 is equal to 1,2 percent and the F value is 2,81. 
  
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 1.466977 0.230029 6.38 <.0001 Intercept 
INSUR 1 0.090040 0.055890 1.61 0.1079 INSUR 
OPTIONS 1 0.352639 0.092450 3.81 0.0002 OPTIONS 
LNCAPEXP 1 0.011358 0.040503 0.28 0.7793 LNCAPEXP 
TRADE 1 -0.12051 0.089672 -1.34 0.1797 TRADE 
SHIP 1 -0.44384 0.205774 -2.16 0.0316 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.07994 0.039329 -2.03 0.0427 LNSIZE 
YEAR1999 1 -0.06002 0.106440 -0.56 0.5731 YEAR1999 
YEAR2000 1 -0.04506 0.106444 -0.42 0.6723 YEAR2000 
YEAR2001 1 -0.16515 0.107807 -1.53 0.1263 YEAR2001 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable D
F 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variable 
Label 
Intercept 1 1.367220 0.148829 9.19 <.0001 Intercept 
INSUR 1 0.084727 0.049322 1.72 0.0865 INSUR 
OPTIONS 1 0.333589 0.079041 4.22 <.0001 OPTIONS 
SHIP 1 -0.44635 0.168479 -2.65 0.0084 SHIP 
LNSIZE 1 -0.07220 0.021475 -3.36 0.0008 LNSIZE 
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